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
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Washington, D. C. 20505



24 AUG 1977

Dear Colonel Masters,

Your excellent article on "The Ethics of Intelligence Activities" from National Security Affairs Forum has just come to my attention. I found it very stimulating and helpful. There is so little of worth that has been written in this field that I am grateful to have the benefit of your clear thoughts in this area.

I was intrigued by your five-fold breakdown of intelligence functions. Today we don't make much of a distinction between special operations, political warfare, and deception. You acknowledge that, to a degree, by later in your article aggregating them. I am intrigued, however, with whether it would be desirable to treat them separately rather than all as covert action. Perhaps I'm also saying to myself that I am not sure we adequately deal with the issue of deception and are certainly not organized to do so.

I also was intrigued by your division of the intelligence function into foreign, domestic and production. The domestic collection title concerns me lest it lead the American public to think we are spying on them. I'm sure there is a legitimate need for a certain amount of domestic information in intelligence production, but it seems to me that we should largely get that from the other established agencies in the government. Moreover, this inevitably leads us into the murky waters of net assessment. One of the principal reasons for wanting information on our own capabilities is in order to make comparative assessments. It is altogether unclear, however, whether the net assessment function should reside in the intelligence community or elsewhere in the government.

Finally, and most importantly, your dissection of the problem of morals and ethics was very helpful. A few weeks after taking over this assignment I chartered an effort to write a code of ethics. We are still working on it without great success, though I think the effort in itself is worthwhile. The only actual ethical guidance I've given to the intelligence community thus far is to consider whether they would be proud to defend their secret actions in public should they ever, unfortunately, be made public. This is no panacea or safeguard. I am sure that many of those whose actions we criticize in retrospect, or in a different

(EXECUTIVE REGISTRY FILE *O/D.../...*)

context as you put it, were proud of what they were doing at the time. The difficulty, it seems to me, lies in the isolation of the intelligence world from the rest of the community, and therefore not always understanding what would meet with approbation and what would meet with condemnation. In some sense I am working on that issue by opening up the intelligence function to greater public scrutiny. It seems to me this will have the double effect of building strength for our actions in the public and keeping the intelligence functionaries more attuned to what the public wants and will tolerate. Attached is a copy of a speech I gave recently with this as one of the themes. I take the liberty of foisting this on you to show that somewhere between this approach and writing a specific code of ethics is where I stand at the moment in grappling with this problem. I'd enjoy any thoughts you have on where between these approaches I might best fulfill my responsibilities to the people in the intelligence community in giving them adequate guidance on the ethical aspects of their work.

Again, thanks for the stimulus of your writing.

Yours sincerely,


STANSFIELD TURNER

Enclosure

Colonel Barrie P. Masters, USA
W370-US Army Missile Research & Development Command
Redstone Arsenal, Alabama 35809

1 cy to



SECRECY IN AMERICAN SOCIETY

REMARKS BY
ADMIRAL STANSFIELD TURNER
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

12 AUGUST 1977
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE
BEVERLY WILSHIRE HOTEL
LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA

STAT

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Colonel Barrie P. Masters (USA) is an Operations Research and Systems Analysis Officer who has done considerable work in the field of tactical and strategic intelligence. He was educated at the University of Oklahoma, BS; and the University of Southern California, MS. Colonel Masters was a member of the Class of 1976 at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces.

THE ETHICS OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

How can we further America's interest in a world where power remains the ultimate arbiter, and at the same time remain committed to the strong moral values that gave birth to our Nation? How do we reconcile and advance both aspects of our national purpose? In short, how do we resolve the relationship between principle and the needs of power?

The above quotation from a speech by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger on July 15, 1975, appears to capture the essence of the current national debate over the role of ethics in the conduct of our national intelligence activities. Unfortunately the answers to these questions are not easily derived. The subject of ethics is difficult enough to come to grips with when one is talking about such relatively mundane activities as the practice of medicine or law or the pursuit of business profits. An examination of ethics as applied to our national intelligence activities, especially in peacetime, is made enormously more difficult by a score of unique factors. Included among these is the lack of general agreement over the legitimacy of the intelligence function itself, the difficulty of separating ends from means in specific functional areas and the belief in many quarters that the requirement for secrecy is such a vitally inherent component of a successful "intelligence activity" that the subject cannot even be properly

debated. Because of these difficulties, it seems that it is essential to begin by making some effort to define the terms "intelligence activities" and "ethics" before discussing them and to do this in a way that permits ends to be separated from means. After all, there is little point in debating the extent to which the public should have access to intelligence information, if the public has decided that intelligence collection is a repugnant operation which must be terminated.

Intelligence Activities

From the outset, it is important to establish that the term intelligence activities covers a variety of functions which, while often employing similar or even common means, are clearly aimed at different ends. If there is any common thread to define intelligence activities in a modern context, it is only that they involve the secret or erstwhile secret actions of one nation against others. The British divide the activities that we generally call "intelligence" activities into five main functional areas:

1. Offensive Intelligence—the business of divining the secrets of other nations.
2. Counter-Intelligence and Security—operations designed to deny friendly secrets to the opposition.

3. Special Operations—the business of carrying out or supporting clandestine warfare against another state.

4. Political Warfare—the clandestine effort to influence the minds of the people or officials of another state.

5. Deception—the effort to disguise the true intentions of one's own policies and actions.

The advantage of recalling the British terminology for these various activities is to take note of the fact that the British assign each of these functions to distinct organizational entities. In the US this is not the case and the functional distinctions seem to have become badly blurred. One functional area (e.g., the responsibility for collecting information and producing intelligence about other nations) can be (and is) the responsibility of many agencies. At the same time a given intelligence agency (e.g., the CIA) can be (and is) involved in several or all of the functional activities simultaneously. These facts result in enormous semantic difficulties when the debate over the ethics (or, if you will, the morality) of an issue is joined. Take, for example, the following extract from a *Time* essay on the CIA (*Time*, 29 Sept 1975):

It was a year ago this month that the first revelation of Central Intelligence Agency dabbling in Chilean politics came out. Since then, more than a quarter-century's worth of skeletons... have tumbled from the agency's closet. Today the CIA is the least secret espionage service in the world, and its director, William Colby, the most visible and interrogated master spy in recent history. The agency has been in hot water before, of course. But unlike the uproar that followed the Bay of Pigs fiasco in 1961, the current controversy threatens the very existence of the CIA.

The CIA has lost, perhaps forever, the special dispensation that

it was allowed by many Americans and their elected representatives for the first 27 years of its existence. Few people today accept unquestioningly the notion that clandestine foreign operatives are a necessary evil. Even fewer would unblinkingly buy the assurance voiced by former CIA Director Richard Helms: "The nation must to a degree take it on faith that we, too, are honorable men devoted to her service." Almost daily, newspaper editorials, legislators and some presidential hopefuls characterize the CIA as a wasteful anachronism at best, an international menace and national disgrace at worst.

While William Colby is characterized as a master spy, the thrust of the criticism in *Time's* article (like many others) has nothing to do with spying—it has to do with the conduct of special operations or political warfare. It turns out that it is not unusual for the arguments about the ethics of intelligence activities to be like this—with the antagonists and protagonists talking about completely different subjects (one view is that the CIA is essential because national survival depends on intelligence while another argues that the CIA is a national disgrace because it has been known to dabble in Chilean politics).

The term "intelligence activities" has become so corrupted and misunderstood that it holds little useful meaning, particularly for the general public. Actually there are three distinctly different activities carried out under this sobriquet, each of which must be examined separately.

A. The Intelligence Function

The intelligence function is only the production of knowledge, usually about other states. It is a function that has been carried out by states throughout recorded history.

What enables the wise sovereign to achieve things beyond the reach of

~~ordinary men is foreknowledge. Such knowledge is not available from the gods, from the study of history or from calculations. It must be obtained by the use of secret agents. SUN-TZU, Chinese military theorist, 600 BC.~~

And the Lord spake unto Moses saying, Send thou men that they may search the land of Canaan. And Moses sent them to spy out the land to see what it is and the people, whether they be strong or weak, few or many. Old Testament, Numbers 13:16.

Adequate knowledge of the policies, aspirations, and capabilities of foreign states, linked with adequate information about one's own domestic intentions and capabilities, provides the foundation on which each state can build its national policies. The requirement for states to interact with other states, whether they be friendly or belligerent, carries with it a requirement for states to develop knowledge as a basis for their foreign policy decisions. This requirement in turn places an inescapable responsibility on the national leadership of each state to provide for the collection of information from and about other states. The fact that Americans have historically been somewhat uncomfortable with the uses and responsibilities of power does not diminish in any way the obligation of our national government to provide for the collection and evaluation of information (i.e., the production of intelligence). The fact that the USA is in the position it is, as a world power, means that this effort has assumed global proportions.

7 The discharge of the intelligence function requires the accomplishment of three separate but related actions: 1) the acquisition of information from or about other nations, which is the foreign collection effort, 2) the acquisition of relevant information about one's own state—its citizens, economy, capabilities, limitations, requirements, etc., which is the domestic collection effort and, 3) the analysis and interpretation of the two sets of information, is termed the intelligence production

effort. Each of these aspects of the intelligence function poses very different ethical problems. For example, given the fact that information exists, there do not seem to be any ethical questions associated with the production of finished intelligence. The analyst is indeed an honorable man in the service of his country. The ethical questions really all arise in the conduct of foreign and domestic information collection. In fact, it is the latter—domestic collection—that seems to raise the most dogmatic, unreasoned outcries from its critics, and the least degree of outspoken defense from its defenders.

B. Special Operations

A second distinct function that intelligence agencies carry out is the conduct of operations or activities that are directed at influencing events rather than at producing knowledge.

The service [British Secret Service] is not only an instrument for gathering other people's secrets but also for making mischief among the King's enemies. Any act is permissible, even assassination. The only crime is to be caught. If an agent is caught, he will be disowned.

—Smith-Dummings, Chief
British Secret Service, 1911-1939

There are many kinds of maneuvers in war some only of which take place upon the battlefield. There are maneuvers far to the flank or rear. There are maneuvers in time, in diplomacy, in psychology, all of which are removed from the battlefield, but react often decisively on it.

—Winston Churchill
1925

This function is known under a variety of euphemisms, such as special operations, special warfare, strategic services, etc., and may be considered to involve such things as propaganda, bribery, murder, deception, sabotage, war and a

host of lesser actions against foreign individuals or states. It is in this category that we find such actions as the Bay of Pigs operation, the influencing of Chilean politics, assassination plots, and so on. These operations are called intelligence activities for reasons that are very unclear, except that they may involve common sources and similar means, and frequently the responsibility for their conduct rests with agencies called intelligence agencies. The British categories of special operations, political warfare and, to some extent, deception all fit into this single functional area.

C—Counterintelligence and Security

A third distinct function that is carried out by intelligence agencies are those activities aimed at stopping other states from gaining knowledge or carrying out operations that are considered inimical to one's own interests. This area is fairly well understood, commonly defined and has seldom been the subject of ethical confusion. A nation certainly has a right to protect its secrets and prevent subversive or other inimical actions against its people. Also, since for all practical purposes we can say this is largely a domestic operation, the ethics of counterintelligence and security activities tend to be proscribed by domestic laws. It is precisely here, however, that ethical questions now arise. The questions involve means rather than ends. Is it ethical to ignore or even break domestic laws in the pursuit of counterintelligence and security goals? Apparently Richard Nixon

thought it was when he equated domestic opposition to a national security threat. Apparently the British XX Committee thought it was when they executed only German agents who didn't cooperate, sparing those who did. Apparently the CIA and the Postal Department thought it was when they surveilled the mail of private citizens in the name of national security, and so on. Unlike the ethical questions raised by foreign and domestic collection activities, and special operations, where the questions are generally about morality in the absence of standards, the ethical considerations of counterintelligence and security activities seem to predominantly involve the morality of violating accepted standards, usually legal ones.

One other dimension needs to be considered before one can apply an ethical yardstick to any of these activities. That is the question of war or peace. A soldier has no difficulty in rationalizing his role as a killer in wartime with the fact that it is a crime for him to kill in peacetime. How about the intelligence operative? Does he have one yardstick for war and one for peace? If he does, how does he judge whether we are at war or peace in the modern context? Does the same rationalization apply to justify the collection of information about one's potential enemies, as about one's actual enemies? How about the collection of information about one's friends?

Between the extremes of peace and war lies a spectrum of international relationships which,

FUNCTION

	Foreign Collection	Domestic Collection	Special Operation	Counterintelligence and Security
War	BLACK ZONE			
Varying International Tensions	GREY ZONE			
Peace	WHITE ZONE			

particularly in the past thirty years, has rendered many historical standards inappropriate. How does the intelligence operative, or for that matter the government, determine an appropriate morality for this vast range of circumstances? Perhaps only one thing should be clear. It is unlikely that the question can be answered in the simple context of a single ethical standard, or even of fixed ethical standards. The solution is more likely to involve the development of ethical standards for each of the situations depicted in the figure on page 4 in a manner which also recognizes a third dimension of complexity—time and situation.

Ethics

Most people who think of ethics in terms of good or bad behavior usually proceed to apply their own standards of good or bad to judge the behavior in question. This may have some value from the individual's perspective, but it is of only small relevance to the formulation of an ethical practice. It is the existence of an ethical standard that provides us with a capability to make collective judgments about what is good or bad in society, just as it is the existence of a code of ethics that allows an individual to judge the morality of his own conduct and actions in the light of contemporary circumstances. Such a code does not seem consciously to exist in the US intelligence community, or if it does, people in responsible positions have been very slow to defend it.

It is not useful to approach the problem as if the question is about the ethics of an agency (Is the CIA a national disgrace?). Nor is it particularly useful to castigate the perpetrators of historical events in the intelligence arena for whom no standards existed except their own judgment of what was required to ensure national security and survival. Nor is it particularly useful to try to apply the precedents of domestic law to the conduct of anything like foreign collection—the Constitution does not impart rights on foreign nations, etc. What is important, at this point in time, is to establish some understanding of what ethics are

and of how a code of ethics should be applied to each of the areas described in the first part of this paper.

What do we mean by ethics? Despite the almost overwhelming national debate, it is remarkable that there has been so little effort to define the term ethics in any of the current literature on the intelligence community. That is not to say it hasn't been done, but it certainly must not have been done often. Nor is that to say that the term ethics is not used. It is used often by both the antagonists and the protagonists of the behavior of the intelligence community, but always without explanation. Authors and speakers alike use the term as if it carries a crystal clear meaning to their audiences, but inevitably the real basis for their argument is a key, usually an implicit but often debatable assumption.

Take, for example, the following extract from Lyman Kirkpatrick's recent book, *The U.S. Intelligence Community*, in which he poses a number of rhetorical questions as a basis for his discussion of ethics:

Are the intelligence activities of the US government consistent with American ideology? Has the US succumbed to the philosophy that the ends justify the means? Is American democracy in danger of being destroyed by the means purportedly being used to preserve it? If the legitimacy of the intelligence community is established, what are the ethical and moral bases for such activities? Have the ethical aspects of intelligence work served in any way to damage or destroy the morality of the nation?

Kirkpatrick accepts the currently fashionable assumptions that the ethics of intelligence activities should be approached from the perspective of American "ideology," honorable means, democracy, the morality of the nation, and so on, without ever discussing the relevance of these concepts.

The uselessness of Kirkpatrick's answer to his own questions perhaps illustrates as well as anything the potential difficulties of accepting this approach (although his conclusions do not differ greatly from other similar attempts by supposedly knowledgeable people).

While intelligence work may not be among man's most honorable activities, neither is it the least worthy. If the people of the US believe in their way of life and want it to survive, then they must take the steps necessary for survival.

His answer, which infers that since there may be at least one less honorable profession somewhere, things must not be all bad, and that anything that contributes to the maintenance of our way of life should be acceptable, cannot give much comfort to those who believe that a question of ethics requires searching appraisal.

How should ethics be defined? There are many definitions in the literature. For example, Webster's defines ethics as (1) "the study of standards of conduct and moral judgment or (2) the system or code of morals of a particular philosopher, group or profession." However, in the specialized literature ethics is defined in terms of several more difficult concepts. Some authors use the term "the doctrine of moral principles" to define ethics, others use the term "the science of human conduct," still others see ethics in terms of a "moral philosophy." One can see the difficulties with all these attempts at definition as soon as they are applied to real situations. There is no generally accepted doctrine of moral principles. There is no scientific way to explain all human conduct. There are numerous moral philosophies to call upon.

The words moral, ethical, virtuous and righteous are commonly used interchangeably. But these words also provide for a great deal of flexibility in constructing an argument about what is ethical. It can be (and is) argued that ethics has nothing to do with common morals or uncommon virtue; that what is ethical can

depend on a higher order of rationalization such as that used to justify the theft and disclosure of national secrets on the basis that there is a higher order appeal to reason than merely obeying the law or a government regulation.

Morality relates to good or bad behavior. But the determination of what is good or bad behavior is highly subjective, depending on what society is used to and the underlying philosophical basis for the judgment of behavior. Morals change over time; they are readily shaped as society changes. What is important to understand is that *moral* implies conformity with a generally accepted standard of goodness or rightness of conduct or character at a given time. That is, morality must be judged against a prevailing code of ethics, not the other way around.

The question of ethical behavior in the intelligence community only becomes relevant if one in fact has a code of ethics. Much of the current furor over the past behavior of the US intelligence community seems to be based on a false promise that there is something called a code of American behavior for people in the intelligence business. There is of course no such thing. "American ideology" does not provide much guidance for "honorable men dedicated to the service of their country" when the alternatives may involve the destruction of the state itself or even the destruction of all mankind. A code of ethics must provide an objective set of standards to help an individual decide the moral questions which he faces from time to time and the basis by which a wider society judges the morality of individual acts. The important question for America to answer is not what the code should contain in specific terms but who should establish it. There are three of many possible answers to this question.

A. Society As A Whole

The American people are entitled to know what their government has done, the good and the bad, the right and the wrong.

—Senator Church
June, 1975

Who decides? 7
The leaking of official secrets is desirable if the official secret is information that the government is improperly hiding from the public and which the public has a right to know. This is a very important part of democracy.

—Senator Cranston
 August, 1975

Both of these statements are based on a supposition that all activities of the national government are conducted solely in the interests of individual members of society, that individual members of society must be informed of everything done on their behalf by their government, and that out of this exchange will come some form of appropriate guidance. If one argues that intelligence activities are only conducted on behalf of the individual members of society, one can argue that it is only right and proper that society as a whole create the code of ethics. It may seem that the ethics of every government agency should be established by the people to whom it is responsible, but the facts are that this has generally never been the case, and, in any case, this would clearly present the most difficult set of criteria to come to grips with. There are a number of problems inherent in any claim that individual interests predominate in the formulation of a public policy. To what extent can individuals be relied on to know what their own interests are? To what extent is it permissible for the society to give special weight to the interests of some individuals rather than others? How can the inevitably conflicting interests of millions of people be justly served by policies that do not serve them equally? Should certain interests such as personal liberty and freedom from search be accorded such extraordinary weight that they transcend another interest such as national security or are there gradations of individual rights throughout the fabric of our society? These problems generally make it impractical to formulate anything as complex as the subject on the basis of individual interests.

B. The Government

Another approach to the establishment of a code of intelligence ethics is to place responsibility on the group, within the society as a whole, which logically can be judged to hold rational and informed views toward the intelligence function itself and which, from the viewpoint of both the community and the society at large, has a legitimate responsibility toward standards-setting. In general, in the United States, it is the government grouping of which the intelligence community is a part, to which it reports, and to which it holds itself responsible that fills this requirement. In fact it is this group that the intelligence services tend to fall back on as the legitimate arbiter of ethical standards wherever forced by circumstances away from the use of "guild" ethics (which will be discussed next). Apart from the fact that this approach eliminates some of the complexities of the previous approach—it potentially, at least, limits the need to disseminate information which no one wants in the hands of foreign nations. It implicitly recognizes the argument that there is a national interest, conceived as something more than the interests of its individual members.

C. The Intelligence Community

Using the narrowest definition of ethics (the code of a particular profession) it can be argued (and is) that the code of ethics of the American intelligence community is set from within by the code of the world-wide intelligence community and that this is established by historical custom and practice. Using this concept, individuals regard themselves as highly skilled members of a worldwide "guild," practicing an art little understood outside the guild. Their activities are shrouded in secrecy, though they draw on a common history and common experiences. Individuals tend to have a common respect for each other as practitioners of a vital and sometimes dangerous trade regardless of whether they are cooperating or in opposition to each other.

The obvious tendency of this grouping is to judge intelligence ethics in the light of "what the other guys do." By implication, common practices are ethical, successful practices are ethical, or "whatever has to be done" is ethical. That the ethics of the American intelligence community have been "guild ethics" in the past should not be a surprise, nor a cause for criticism. With a couple of exceptions (like Stimson's policy "Gentlemen do not read each other's mail" and Eisenhower's acknowledgment of his responsibility for U-2 flights) there has never been any attempt by either the government or the people to establish any other basis for a code of ethics since the time the nation was founded. Nor should one jump necessarily to the conclusion that the guild ethics of the past are not in fact in the best interests of the nation after all. They have certainly stood other nations in good stead for more centuries than this country has existed.

Summary Conclusion

It is virtually impossible today for an individual to take a rational position for or against any specific intelligence action on moral grounds. It is ridiculous to pontificate about actions that occurred in the past unless a domestic law violation was clearly involved. What is lacking is a code of ethics against which the morality of actions can be judged.

To conform with most Christian moral philosophies, a code of ethics would have to be a relative code and judgments would have to be made in terms of what is called "contextual ethics." This means that right would be determined by the total context of the decision and of reality, not by the application of moral laws from outside the context of the circumstances. This is a principle that seems to have escaped the notice of those who are currently bent on a witch hunt in the intelligence community.

There is no such thing as an American national ethic against which the morality of intelligence activities past, present, and future

can be judged. There is, therefore, no reasoned response to the question, is this or that activity consistent with an established morality, unless the action is one that clearly broke a law. Even then, if one argues that a nation's survival is its first and ultimate responsibility, and that national goals are conceived as something greater than individual goals, what is ethical does not necessarily need to be lawful. To quote two famous people from the annals of British history again:

We are bred to feel it is a disgrace ever to succeed by falsehood ... we keep hammering on the conviction that honesty is the best policy and that truth always wins in the long run. These pretty little sentiments do well for a child's copy book, but a man who acts on them had better sheathe his sword for ever.

—Sir Garnet Wolsely
Commander-in-Chief, British Army, 1869

In war-time truth is so precious that she should always be attended by a bodyguard of lies.

—Winston Churchill
Prime Minister, 1943

Again, what would be judged immoral in one context may have nothing to do with what is judged to be ethical in other circumstances.

The first key requirement is to differentiate between so-called intelligence activities on the basis of the ends they serve. Only then can questions of morality be applied to ends as well as means. Four functions have been identified which should be examined separately, each under a variety of scenarios ranging from what is traditionally known as war to what may pass for peace. The objective of this examination should be to avoid throwing the baby out with the bathwater in a spasm of righteous and misplaced morality. While it is nice for this nation to be at peace and to dream of being at peace for ever, history should teach the merits of using at least a certain amount of caution in that regard.

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22 August 1977

Dear Mr. Kaplan:

Thank you for your letter regarding what you consider to be a photograph of Abraham Lincoln. I regret the analysis that you suggest does not fall within the purview of the Central Intelligence Agency, and we therefore can not assist you. Perhaps the Smithsonian could point you in the right direction.

Your photograph is enclosed.

Sincerely,

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Deputy Executive Secretary

Enclosure

Mr. Albert Kaplan

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77-5522

August 16, 1977

The Director
C. I. A.
Washington, D.C.

Dear Sir,

Although I write to you in your official capacity to ask your cooperation in a matter of national interest and importance, it is also to the private citizen that I write.

Recently I acquired a daguerreotype portrait of a young man. I am certain he is Abraham Lincoln. My attempts at confirmation with Lincoln scholarship circles have failed miserably. The regrettable truth is that Lincoln scholarship is virtually nonexistent these days. Instead we have whippersnaps curators.

The only other avenue to authentication that I can think of is scientific analysis.

Here ^{he} is. Like the daguerreotype itself the print is the reverse image of the subject. Also enclosed are the remarks of Doctor Stark of New York. At the time he wrote the letter he did not know the image was reversed.

In addition to Doctor Stark's eight points I have found 12 more. If you decide to do this and you want all the details I can supply, I will do so with great pleasure.

Sincerely yours,
Albert Hepler

Enclosures: 2

Aug 18 11 10 AM '77

EW

RICHARD BOIES STARK, M.D., P.C.
PLASTIC, RECONSTRUCTIVE AND HAND SURGERY
115 EAST 67TH STREET
NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10021
UNIVERSITY 1-1442

July 27, 1977

Mr. Albert Kaplan
Gruntal & Company
50 Broadway
New York, N.Y. 10004

Dear Mr. Kaplan:

I have studied the enlarged picture of the young man which you left at my office with great interest. I have compared it with other photographs of Abraham Lincoln depicted in Stefan Lorants', Lincoln, A Picture Story of His Life, New York, W. W. Norton & Co., 1969. In particular have I compared it with the photograph upon page 54, which is stated to be the earliest photograph of Lincoln known to exist. This is Lincoln at the age of 38.

I cannot, after examination, say that your picture is not Lincoln, but, if it be Lincoln, it is a very young Lincoln, perhaps about 30 - 32 years of age.

Here are some points of striking similarity:

1. The Darwinian tubercle of his right ear and the free-hanging ear lobule.
2. A similar jaw angle.
3. A cleft chin.
4. Full lips, prominent upper lip Cupid's bow and upper lip philtrum.
5. Slight nasal hump in upper 1/3 of the nose.
6. Deep-set eyes, prominent tarsal fold.
7. Beginning glabellar frowns.
8. Similar zygomatic & zygomatic arches.

What appears dissimilar is the hair which is parted upon the right. You mentioned that he changed this. Another characteristic feature that appears to be missing here is the nevus (mole) of the right nasolabial fold, so much a hallmark in later years. The nevus, though, upon magnification, appears to be present though unpigmented (amelanotic), which often may become pigmented as one gets older.

Again, Mr. Kaplan, I cannot say that your photograph is Mr. Lincoln; on the other hand, I cannot, after study, say that it is not.

Thank you for allowing me to see this interesting photograph.

Sincerely,



Washington, D. C. 20505



20 August 1977

Dear Captain Wigelius:

Having settled down here after two hurried trips to the West Coast, it was a pleasure to find your thoughtful letter of 5 August. I must say I am flattered to be in such company as you describe. Certainly they faced and met the challenge at hand. In any event, your confidence and best wishes are greatly appreciated.

Thank you for writing.

Yours,

STANSFIELD TURNER

Captain Frank E. Wigelius, USN (Ret.)




AT

(EX-107) REGISTRY FILE 010cI/alpha

Directorate of Central Intelligence

Washington, D. C. 20505



20 AUG 1977

Dear Captain Wigelius:

Having settled down here after two hurried trips to the West Coast, it was a pleasure to find your thoughtful letter of 5 August. I must say I am flattered to be in such company as you describe. Certainly they faced and met the challenge at hand. In any event, your confidence and best wishes are greatly appreciated.

Thank you for writing.

Yours,

/s/ Stansfield Turner

STANSFIELD TURNER

Captain Frank E. Wigelius, USN (Ret.)



77-8661

FRANK E. WIGELIUS
ATTORNEY AT LAW



STAT

AREA CODE 904
TELEPHONE 369-8510

August 5, 1977


Admiral Stansfield Turner
Director, Central Intelligence Agency,
Washington, D. C. 20510

Dear Admiral Turner:

My heartiest congratulations on your original appointment and current additional vital duties! A great friend, our new President, Jimmy Carter '47, has indeed made a very wise choice in you, and I feel very strongly that you will measure up to the greatness of my special friends of my naval aviator days, famed Admirals Richmond Kelly Turner, Felix B. Stump, J. J. "Joco" Clark, all in the Valhalla of distinguished naval officers. Good luck!

With every good wish, I am,

Cordially yours,


A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Frank E. Wigelius".

Frank E. Wigelius '32
Captain USN (Ret.)

FEW:ww

STAT

FRANK E. WIGELIUS CAPT USN (Ret.)
ATTORNEY AT LAW



Personal



Admiral Stansfield Turner
Director, Central Intelligence Agency,
Washington, D. C., 20510

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Washington, D. C. 20505

Executive Registry
77-8786

19 August 1977

The Honorable John M. Thomas
Assistant Secretary for
Administration
Department of State
Washington, DC 20520

Dear John:

Enclosed are the employment forms I mentioned to you on Friday, 19 August. If you would have the young gentleman execute them and then phone me on [redacted] after he has done so, we will set a date up and have a chat. As I am sure you can realize, I cannot make a commitment at this time but will give it the good old college try.

Sincerely,

J.F. Blake

John F. Blake
Acting Deputy Director

Enclosures

(EXECUTIVE REGISTRY FILE)

OPCI/Alpha

ADDCI:JFBlake:kmg (19 Aug 77)

Distribution:


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WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505



15 August 1977

Mr. Herbert P. Scoville

AT

Dear Mr. Scoville:

The attached letter from the Academic Committee of Washington University requesting your current office and/or home address is forwarded to you for any action you feel appropriate.

Sincerely,

B. C. Evans
Executive Secretary

Attachment
As Stated

- ✓ 1 - ER w/basic
- 1 - ES Chrono

(EXECUTIVE REGISTRY FILE)

0/005/0001-3

Executive Registry

Box 1068
Washington University
St. Louis, Missouri 63130

August 5, 1977

Deputy Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C.

Dear Sir:

The Academic Committee of Washington University, responsible for arranging lecture presentations on campus, would like to get in touch with Herbert Scoville, former CIA Deputy Director. Please send us Mr. Scoville's present office and/or home address and telephone number.

Thank you for your assistance

Sincerely,




Michael Riordan

25X1

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rec'd 12 Aug 77

HIGHLAND PARK HIGH SCHOOL CLASS OF 1941

INFORMAL REUNION

SATURDAY, OCTOBER 1, 1977

AT THE HIGHLAND PARK ELKS LODGE - 740 LAUREL AVE.

7:00 P.M. - 12:30 A.M.

DRINKS

MUSIC

SNACKS

NOSTALGIA!

FUN

This event will be a combined reunion with the classes of '39, '40 & '42.

Both nights of our 1976 reunion were such fun that the we all decided to have a get-together every year! The class of '42 has asked to be included.

About 360 people attended the dinner dance last July, and the evening was much too short! We had a turnout from all over the U.S., and our class had the largest attendance of the three. We hope that some of you who couldn't come last year will be able to this time. We were able, after all expenses, to make a generous contribution to the HPHS Scholarship Fund, and we were thanked profusely.

One sad note is that we have lost four of our favorite teachers since the reunion--Elizabeth Bredin, Harold Finch, Dave Floyd, & "Solly" Thurston.

Tom (E.) Brown was most generous in printing up our class list for us, and there are plenty of copies for anyone who doesn't have one. If you would like one, please send a 26¢ stamped long envelope. If you have moved since last July, or are about to, please send your new address, because we want to keep our list up-to-date.

THIS WILL BE YOUR ONLY REMINDER OF THE REUNION, SO MARK YOUR CALENDAR NOW!

Mail your check for \$3.00 per person in advance to:

HPHS Class reunion

Mrs. Robert Weinberg (Nina D'Ancona)

(312-432-5972)

EXECUTIVE REGISTRY FILE

STAT

Stan -
Congratulations on your new job! Read about you all the time - Can't
pay I envy you, but wish you lots of luck. Hope you can
show how much it to H.P. This time -
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EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

Routing Slip


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19	DCI/SS				
20	Sgt Moore	X			
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Remarks:

For Admiral Turner

Executive Secretary

12 Aug 77



11 August 1977

Dear Alice,

It is with sadness for the Agency, but happiness for you, that I have learned of your forthcoming retirement on 12 August. Your absolutely dependable contribution to the Agency through the years has made you an invaluable employee and your fine personality and disposition has made you an individual with whom it has been a pleasure to be associated.

We wish you well and you leave with our high respect and good wishes.

Sincerely,

/s/ Jack Blake

John F. Blake
Acting Director

ADCI:JFBlake:kmg (11 Aug 77)

Distribution:

Orig - Adse (by hand via O/D/Pers upon processing out)

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(EXEMPTION REGISTRY FILE) *C/D 12/10/77*

Executive Registry

77-8405A

1 0 AUG 1977

Dear B.C.,

How wonderful to hear from you. I remember so well our days together on CONQUEST just as though it were yesterday.

My thanks for your congratulations on my new and challenging assignment. It is quite different than the Navy, but a marvelous opportunity to do something of value for our country. My wife and I are very sorry to hear that your wife passed on--Patricia remembers her well from the period we were deployed to the Far East. I am pleased that your family has grown up so well. You had some immense responsibilities in raising that younger one by yourself.

I'm proud that you have done so well in your post-Navy career. There is nothing more important than retaining our faith in God and helping all those others whom we have an opportunity to befriend. I'm sure you're doing a great deal of good in that respect.


Again, thanks for your nice letter and the chance to get caught up, and very best wishes.

Yours,




STANSFIELD TURNER

Reverend B.C. Daniel



(EXECUTIVE REGISTRY FILE

O/Dcl/alpha



Dear Rev. Daniel:

Thank you most sincerely for your letter of congratulations on my appointment as Director of Central Intelligence. I very much appreciate your thoughtful words, and the spirit of friendship which prompted them.


I look on the job as a special opportunity to serve our people and our nation.

Best regards to you and your family.

Yours sincerely,

STANSFIELD TURNER

Rev. B. C. Daniel





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Executive Registry

97-8405

REV. B. C. DANIEL

"I CAN DO ALL THINGS THROUGH
CHRIST WHO STRENGTHENS ME"

AT

July 16, 1977

TO: Adm. STANSFIELD TURNER
CIA DIRECTOR
PENTAGON Building
ARLINGTON, Virginia.

FM: B. C. DANIEL QMC USN - RETIRED AN OLD FRIEND
YOUR FIRST QM ON THE U.S.S. CONQUEST (MSO 48)
WAY BACK IN 1957-58.

BT CONGRATULATIONS ON YOUR NEW ASSIGNMENT
THE PRESIDENT COULD NOT HAVE FOUND A MORE
HONEST MAN.

YOU WERE ALWAYS AN OFFICER AND GENTLEMAN
EVEN WHEN WE WERE ALL YOUNG MEN.

I LIKED THE DECISION TO MAINTAIN YOUR
RANK THAT WAS WISE.

HOPE THAT YOUR FAMILY IS FINE AND IN
GOOD HEALTH, DOES YOUR DAD STILL LIVE.

MY FAMILY ARE ALL GROWN NOW, EXCEPT
ONE 12yr old Boy.

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WE LOST THEIR MOTHER 11 yrs ago.
WHILE I WAS IN VIETNAM
I'VE BEEN RETIRED RIGHT YEARS NOW.
AND IT TOOK AWHILE TO GET ADJUSTED
TO THE CIVILIAN LIFE.

By THE ENCLOSED CARD YOU CAN SEE
THE NEW BUSINESS I'M IN.
NO BILLY GRAHAM NOR ANDY YOUNG
BUT I DID ANSWER THE CALL OF GOD.

I'M NOW A JUNIOR IN A VERY GOOD BIBLICAL
COLLEGE HERE.

HOPES TO DO SOME MISSIONARY WORK, FOREIGN
AND HOME MISSION.

ARE YOU STILL IN YOUR FAITH??

I AND MANY OTHERS WERE GLAD THAT WE
FINALLY GOT SOME CHRISTIANS IN HIGH
GOVERNMENT POSITION.

I'M A SECURITY OFFICER FOR L.A. COUNTY
NEVER SEEM TO BE ABLE TO GET OUT OF WEARING
SOME KIND OF UNIFORM.

WHEN YOU ARE OUT HERE WOULD LIKE TO
SEE YOU ARE HEAR FROM YOU.

STAT

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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505

Executive Registry

77-8678/10

10 AUG 1977

Dear Norm:

Before I take off for a few days' vacation, I want you to know how much I appreciate your thoughtful note of 4 August. It certainly provided a welcome flashback to those great days in Highland Park and the halls of Braeside School.

It sounds as if you have your hands full servicing the eastern half of Long Island. As for me, you may be sure that no two days are alike around here.

Many thanks for writing.

Yours,



STANSFIELD TURNER

Mr. Norman F. Hirsch
Suffolk Life Newspapers
Montauk Highway
Westhampton, New York 11977

(EXECUTIVE REGISTRY FILE 0/DCI/alpha)

77-8678

SUFFOLK LIFE*Reaching over 98% of all the families
on Eastern Long Island***NEWSPAPERS**MONTAUK HIGHWAY
WESTHAMPTON, NEW YORK, 11977
(516) 288-3900 924-4466

NACON



August 4, 1977

Adm. Stanfield Turner
Director, Central Intelligence Agency
McLean, Virginia

Dear Stan,

You're so much in the news these days that you must have received a zillion letters from Highland Parkers and others whom you've known through the years. Mine's another.

When you broke into the front pages a few weeks ago, I began wondering whether you could be the same Stan-Turner from Braeside School, Troop 38, H.P.H.S. etc. who was a year or so ahead of me in school. Darned if you aren't!

You're Ollie Turner's kid from Deere Park!

You went off to Annapolis. I went off to Oberlin a year or two later, in the V-12 program. I wound up an apprentice seaman. You wound up an admiral. Both are undoubtedly just!

After some years in the advertising agency and newspaper business (I published the H.P. News for a bunch of years then started my own paper which is now the H.P. Life), I moved here about four years ago and am sales manager for this company, which circulates 192,000 twice-weekly, blanketing the eastern half of Long Island. I'm married to an H.P. girl who grew up in Hubbard Woods. We have two daughters.

Stan, I'm thrilled at your CIA appointment. If you're the same kid I knew, it follows that you should be an admiral, head of CIA, and anything else you want like night follows day. I cannot imagine any other scenario. I offer you my congratulations and good wishes for a continuingly successful career. I truly feel good knowing that you're at the helm (I know that sounds corny and maudlin, but I do!).

I wouldn't have expected any less of one of Miss Elder's Braeside graduates!

Best always,


Norman F. Hirsch

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Approved For Release 2004/03/16 : CIA-RDP80M00165A002400050001-3



The Center for Strategic and International Studies

Georgetown University / 1800 K Street Northwest / Washington DC 20006 / Telephone 202 / 833-8595

Cable Address: CENSTRAT

STANDARDIZATION: Lessening the Danger of Nuclear War

A Statement for the

Legislation and National Security Subcommittee

Government Operations Committee

House of Representatives

21 July 1977

by

Thomas A. Callaghan Jr., Director

Allied Interdependence Project

Georgetown Center

MR. CHAIRMAN, MEMBERS OF THE LEGISLATION AND NATIONAL SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE:

I thank you for the opportunity to appear before your Subcommittee to discuss standardization, Allied economic cooperation in armaments, and lessening the danger of nuclear war.

In my statement, I will deal first, with what standardization means; second, with the military, economic and political price the North Atlantic Alliance pays for the lack of standardization; third, with the major structural and attitudinal obstacles to standardization; and fourth, with the magnitude of the effort required to achieve economic cooperation in armaments between Europe and North America.

WHAT STANDARDIZATION MEANS. Unfortunately, the term standardization connotes a technical military procurement problem. It is not. There is a military, an economic, and a political dimension to standardization. Taken together, they involve policy issues that merit the continuing attention of the Congress.

Militarily, standardization means at least the same calibers, the same ammunition, the same fuel, the same frequencies, the same data transmission rates, the same identification schemes -- in short, it means that Allied forces should at least be able to operate together.

There are those in Europe and in the United States who say we should focus only on the military dimension of standardization -- on interoperability. It is sufficient, they say, for Allied forces to rearm, refuel and communicate with one another, without being concerned about the economic and political dimensions of the problem. But why settle for so little, when the attainable economic and political dimensions of standardization offer so much more?

Economically, standardization means the efficient utilization of Allied research, development, procurement, logistic and manpower resources. It means no unnecessary duplication of development effort. It means longer production runs, larger weapon quantities and lower unit costs. It means the same repair parts, the same depots, the same maintenance and training facilities and equipment. It means the more effective use of Allied manpower by combining the 14 national logistics systems for 39 armed forces into a single NATO Logistic System for NATO's land, sea and air forces.

It means plowing those duplicative (indeed, multiplicative) logistics resources back into Allied weapons development and production. Thus, standardization can (in its economic dimension) mean many more jobs for the high technology defense industries of Europe and North America. It also makes it possible to share equitably the financial burdens of Allied defense, as well as the economic benefits (jobs, technological progress) of defense development and production.

It means adequate defense, within reasonable defense budgets.

Politically, standardization has both an internal, and an external aspect.

Internally, standardization requires Allied partnership in armaments. It requires a degree of political cohesion within the Alliance that would glue Europe and North America together with bonds of military-economic self-interest so strong as perhaps never to be sundered.

Externally, standardization would say to the Soviet Union that the enormous economic, technological and industrial resources of Europe and North America are now combined for our common defense:

You can not drive a wedge between us; you can not out-produce us; you can not blackmail us; you can not overwhelm us; but you can begin talking to us about meaningful reductions in mankind's armaments burdens.

That day, unfortunately, is some time into the future. Today, for the lack of standardization, the North Atlantic Alliance is in serious trouble.

COST OF DE-STANDARDIZATION. Let us look at the price the North Atlantic Alliance now pays for its de-standardization and non-interoperability. It is a heavy price. Incredibly, Europe and North America, the two richest, most technologically advanced industrial economies in the world, treaty-bound together for mutual security, are being out-produced and out-deployed in almost every conventional weapons area by the more backward economies of the Warsaw Pact.

Yet successive Secretaries of Defense have estimated that NATO and the Warsaw Pact are devoting approximately the same resources to the development, production, training, maintenance, operation and support of general purpose forces. What do these roughly equal defense resource commitments produce?

- * For the Warsaw Pact it produces a massive, standardized collective force, capable of operating effectively together.
- * For NATO it produces a de-standardized collection of forces, qualitatively uneven, quantitatively inferior, unable to fight for the same period of time at the same munitions expenditure rates, and with only a limited ability to rearm, refuel, repair, support, supply or even communicate with one another.

Why is NATO getting so little, and the Warsaw Pact so much, from the same resource expenditures? OLIVER C. BOILEAU, President of Boeing Aerospace Co., recently explained to a Financial Times Conference in London, that

The weapons planners in the communistic nations are capitalizing on what we in the free enterprise system proved long ago -- that one large production run is cheaper and more efficient than many small ones. They are beating us at our own game.

The money we waste in duplication could much better be spent in providing our troops with fewer different weapons in greater numbers, and in developing weapons which improve the ability of our forces to work and fight together. (Emphasis added).

The fourteen armed nations of the North Atlantic Alliance are together spending over \$110,000,000,000 per year -- more than \$9,000,000,000 every month -- on general purpose forces. This sum should provide a credible, collective, war-fighting capability, sufficient to maintain the conventional force balance with the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact. It does not!

The fact that it does not is less a matter of what the massive, conventional force build-up of the Warsaw Pact is doing to NATO, than it is the consequence of what the nations of the Alliance are doing to each other. It's not that the Russians are ten feet tall. They just seem that way -- because we and the other nations of the North Atlantic Alliance have cut ourselves off at our knees.

Today, for example, we Americans, the British, the Dutch, the Germans, the Italians -- and the French and Belgians working together -- seven Allied nations are developing six different tactical communications systems. None of these six systems can communicate with the other, nor can any of them communicate with the NATO Integrated Communications System (NICS). At the NATO Defense Planning Committee meeting in Brussels in May, Defense Secretary HAROLD BROWN offered to re-direct the American Tri-Tac System, if our Allies would do likewise, to see if together we could evolve a common inter-communicable system.

This is a good start, but much more needs to be done. We must reclaim 15 years of Allied failure to cooperate in armaments development, production and support, if we are to begin to match the 10-year build-up of the Warsaw Pact's conventional forces. NATO's Integrated Military Command today commands almost nothing that is integrated: neither its tactical doctrine for the defense of Europe; nor its military equipment requirements; nor its weaponry, its ammunition, nor its repair parts; nor its "days of supply"; nor its logistics, its communications, nor its operational training. This must not be permitted to continue.

Meanwhile, most Allied military and political leaders concede that a Warsaw Pact attack would have to be met by early recourse to theater nuclear weapons, with all the danger of nuclear escalation. One must ask:

Do the heads of government, and the parliaments, of the fourteen armed nations of the Alliance have the moral right to place an annual \$110.0 billion tax burden upon their people, to produce conventional forces collectively so weak, that the day could come when the only difference between NATO and The Alamo is that we would have the option of calling down a nuclear holocaust, before being over-run?

The answer, obviously is NO, they do not have the moral right! Then why do they? There are no easy scapegoats here. Concepts of sovereignty and indepen-

dence resist the obvious need for Allied interdependence and cooperation. President JIMMY CARTER made a dramatic departure from the prepared text of his address to the NATO Ministerial meeting in London to make the point that:

In each of our countries, economic and political factors pose serious obstacles. None of our countries, especially the United States, has been free from fault. (Emphasis added)

OBSTACLES. There are many obstacles to Allied economic cooperation in armaments, but certain attitudinal and structural problems are perhaps the most intractable.

In the United States, public and political attitudes impact upon Pentagon policies, and vice versa. We still see ourselves as the Arsenal of Democracy. We have been slow to realize that even the United States is resource-limited. We prefer to go it alone, to meet any challenge, and so forth.

For more than two years now, we have been engaged in a great national defense debate on "Who is Number One -- the Soviet Union, or the United States?" The debate is reflected in the annual Posture Statements of successive Defense Secretaries, in which fulsome comparisons are made of American and Soviet strategic nuclear, theater nuclear, and general purpose forces.

Policy-makers have been slow to realize that this is both the right and the wrong issue for national debate. It is the right issue if one is comparing strategic nuclear capabilities. Only the United States has the resources to maintain the strategic nuclear balance with the Soviet Union.

But it is the wrong national defense issue if one is comparing conventional force capabilities. The United States does not provide the majority of NATO's conventional forces. Europe does. This means that no matter how large the American defense budget, nor how superior the American weapons technology, the United States can not, by its resources alone, maintain the conventional force balance between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The military-industrial effort required is a NATO effort -- a combined European/North American armaments effort. And there is no such effort!

The media has not reported the need for Allied cooperation. The public is unaware of it. The Congress has not demanded it. Neither the legislation that passed the Congress last year, nor the President's initiatives at the NATO Summit, reflect a broad, strong public or political consensus that we can no longer go it alone. Little wonder then that the FY '78 Defense Posture Statement lists "the role of Allies" in a chapter entitled "Other Considerations". No wonder also, that the Pentagon justifies each weapons development project in terms of its one-on-one superiority over Soviet weaponry -- not on how it would mesh with complementary developments in Europe, and thereby strengthen the conventional force of the Alliance.

If neither the media, nor the public, nor the Congress is concerned as to "Why NATO is Not Number One?" we should not be surprised that the Pentagon isn't too concerned either. The standardization legislation requires the Pentagon to report annually on the progress that is being made in implementing

the legislation. This year the Congress received the Third Annual Rationalization/Standardization Report -- a 104-page, double-spaced document. Seemingly, much is being done. But if the Congress were to study the 386-page single-spaced FY '78 Defense Posture Statement, they would find standardization mentioned on only 6 pages.

In other words, standardization and cooperation with our Allies is for the Pentagon -- as for the nation -- a thing apart.

But putting Allies aside for the moment, even the United States itself pays a high price for trying to go it alone. The Senate Armed Services Committee Report on the FY '78 Authorization bill makes the following points:

Between 1965 and 1975 the funding for technology base programs remained essentially constant, but because of inflation this amounted to an almost 50 percent reduction in real level of effort. (p. 76)

There are strong indications that the Department of Defense tries to keep twice as many projects alive as can be reasonably funded at a full level of effort. The result is that many programs crawl at such a slow rate that they are obsolete well before they are deployed to the forces or are overtaken by subsequently developed technologies. (p. 75)

Over-extended, doing everything ourselves, the Senate Armed Services Committee observations are confirmed in the same FY '78 Defense Posture Statement, which acknowledges that:

The main constraint on the United States, ironically enough, is not trained manpower but military equipment and supplies. (p. 113)

Allied burden-sharing through standardization means technology base deficiencies in the United States could be reinforced by complementary technology base efforts in Europe. Under-funded development projects in the United States could be undertaken in Europe, so that complementary projects on each side of the Atlantic were funded at a full level of effort, and would be moving rapidly towards early production and deployment. With longer production runs, neither the United States, nor Europe, would be constrained by insufficient military equipment and supplies. If our ability to help one another in wartime is to have credibility, then we must demonstrate an ability to work together in peacetime.

This is what the Congress intended when it passed the standardization legislation last year. But it won't just happen. Somebody must be put in charge.

Last year, Mr. CARL DAMM, a member of the Bundestag, and the Chairman of the Defense Cooperation Subcommittee of the North Atlantic Assembly, asked me what the Pentagon would do with this new standardization legislation. I answered not very much until they put somebody in charge. He asked me what I meant.

I answered that if we were to coordinate through the echelons below the

Secretary of Defense, we would have to reach the seventh management level before we would find the first official with full time responsibility for implementing the statutory standardization policy of the United States. And that seventh level official has no management control, no policy control, and no money control.

Mr. DAMM commented: "It is the same in every defense ministry in the Alliance!"

Senators SAM NUNN (Dem. Ga.) and DEWEY F. BARTLETT (Rep. Okla.), in their excellent report on "NATO and the New Soviet Threat", addressed this problem as follows:

Serious consideration should be given to establishing within each ministry of defense powerful bureaucratic constituencies committed solely to achieving standardization and interoperability. For the Department of Defense, this might entail creation of an office of standardization in both the Office of the Secretary of Defense and with each service. The institutionalization of the impetus toward standardization would provide a major counterweight to contrary parochial political and economic interests.

The Congress itself could "institutionalize the impetus toward standardization" by establishing a subcommittee to review our collective NATO posture. During the annual procurement authorization process, the subcommittee could require the Pentagon to present its conventional weapons projects in the context of complementary European projects. The Congress could then assess whether the combined European/North American weapons acquisition programs were designed to maintain the conventional force balance with the Warsaw Pact -- and if not, why not.

The subcommittee could do other things as well:

- * It could insure that the cargoes intended for our planned ten-to-twenty billion-dollar increased airlift-sealift capability are standardized, so that we could "reinforce our Allies";
- * It could inquire as to how many standardized Warsaw Pact divisions, wings, etc. our MBFR negotiators believe must be eliminated to improve the balance with Allied divisions and wings which can not (for the time being) operate effectively together.

This subcommittee would, for the first time in 28 years, provide the Congress with an institutional mechanism and procedure for annually assessing the acquisition, deployment, support, readiness and reinforcement of the Alliance as a collective force. MBFR negotiations could be reviewed for their impact on the collective posture of the Alliance versus the Warsaw Pact. The subcommittee would inevitably focus media attention upon Alliance needs and capabilities. The public would be better informed. The Pentagon would respond to this Congressional interest and concern. And our European Allies

would also respond, for they would want to be seen by the American public to be carrying their fair share of the Allied defense burden.

But burden-sharing can not be separated from benefit-sharing. If Europe is to carry its fair share of the financial burdens, then Europe has the right to expect its fair share of the economic benefits: of the jobs and the challenge and the pride associated with large, technologically significant weapons projects.

It is particularly important that the United States be prepared to meet Europe half-way, or perhaps a little more than half-way. We must recognize that Allied economic cooperation in armaments will be virtually impossible until Europe aggregates its defense procurement efforts, and rationalizes its defense industrial base.

With the Chair's permission, I would like to introduce into the record at the end of my statement an article I wrote for the NATO Review of October, 1976 entitled: "Standardization: Le Defi American a l'Europe" ("The American Challenge to Europe"). Simply stated, this article explains why the European nation-states are too small for cooperation with the United States; why European defense markets are too small to sustain healthy defense industries; and why European defense industries are too small to develop and produce competitive systems to a transatlantic scale.

The Congress recognized this European structural problem in the legislation it passed last year, declaring it to be

....the sense of the Congress that standardization of weapons and equipment within the North Atlantic Alliance on the basis of a "two-way street" concept of cooperation in defense procurement between Europe and North America could only work in a realistic sense if the European nations operated on united and collective basis. Accordingly, the Congress encourages the governments of Europe to accelerate their present efforts to achieve European armaments collaboration among all European members of the Alliance.

President CARTER made much the same point at the NATO Summit when he emphasized that:

A common European defense production effort would help to achieve economies of scale beyond the reach of national programs. A strengthened defense production base in Europe would enlarge the opportunities for two-way trans-Atlantic traffic in defense equipment.

I hope that European and the North American members of the Alliance will join in exploring ways to improve cooperation in the development, production and procurement of defense equipment. This joint examination could involve the European Program Group as it gathers strength and cohesion.

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Mr. Chairman, in your address to the Economic Committee of the North Atlantic Assembly in May, following the NATO Summit, you made the telling point that

While the European members of the Alliance will reach their own conclusions about how the work of the European Program Group should be coordinated with the United States and Canada, I do not think that we can afford a leisurely approach to this problem. (Emphasis added)

You have stated the dilemma we face. On the one hand, Europe will not make the extensive institutional changes and investment which military trade between Europe and North America entails, unless and until they become convinced that the United States is prepared to meet them half-way. On the other hand, the standardization legislation, the President's NATO Summit initiatives, your statement, and these hearings, should make the point that while the United States is prepared to meet Europe half-way -- Europe in turn must meet us half-way -- must achieve European armaments collaboration on a united and collective basis.

How then can we move together? We must recognize that Europe can not (with the best of good will) make these changes by itself. American leadership must play the catalytic role. We must be prepared to offer Europe something that the countries of Europe can not offer one another. The goals I will propose at the end of my statement will indicate how this can be done.

But first, we must face one final attitudinal obstacle found on each side of the Atlantic. It must be overcome, or a credible, collective conventional deterrent will never be possible.

Allied economic cooperation in weapons development, production, trade and support is no small nor easy task. It involves the combined Allied expenditure of more than \$30.0 billion per year on weapons development and procurement -- and an even larger sum on support. Some say the Alliance is too fragile to face up to the task. They see the magnitude of the effort required in all its difficulties. They argue for small, achievable mini-steps. Seemingly, they are satisfied that one or two standardized projects a year represents progress in a more than \$30.0 billion a year weapons acquisition process. But small efforts will not maintain the conventional force balance in Europe in the face of the massive and relentless build-up of Warsaw Pact forces. As the British economist and philosopher John Stuart Mill put it:

For a great evil, a small remedy does not produce a small result; it simply does not produce any results at all.

It is time to abandon the small remedy approach, and face up to the magnitude of the political and economic cooperation required to sustain the military effectiveness of this Alliance. Cooperative structures, macro-economic in scale and demonstrated to be necessary, are bound to garner public and political support. They will also have an appeal to the imagination and idealism of our youth. That in itself is of critical importance. The least-noticed weakness of the North Atlantic Alliance is of the spirit -- its lack of relevance to, and support from, the youth of Europe and North America.

The cooperative and effective utilization of Allied defense resources to create

strong Allied conventional forces, and thereby lessen the danger of nuclear war, is but a first step towards fashioning a world our youth will want to live in. They will expect us to aim high, for the stakes are high.

MAGNITUDE OF EFFORT REQUIRED. Aiming high means we must move rapidly towards economic cooperation in weapons development, production and support. We need to mobilize the already committed resources of this Alliance. But how?

It is instructive to turn back the clock to April, 1941, when Canadian Prime Minister MACKENZIE KING and President FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT met at Hyde Park to discuss a similar problem: how to mobilize the resources of the North American continent.

These were two successful and practical politicians. What they didn't do is every bit as significant as what they did do. They didn't get lost in the bartering of individual projects. They didn't haggle over the resolution of problems. They were much too practical. They knew they could not mobilize the resources of this continent without a valid concept, and a basic structure. They knew also that if the concept and the structure were right -- the projects, and a host of problems associated with the projects, would sort themselves out.

The concept was simply that each country would produce and provide the other with the defense equipment it was best able to make. The structure was also simple: military trade. The weapons and equipment which Canada produced, and sold to the United States -- in turn provided Canada with the dollars it needed to buy weapons and equipment from the United States.

To show they meant business, President ROOSEVELT and Prime Minister KING established dollar purchase goals to be met by each country. Each country, they said, would (in the twelve months following the Hyde Park Agreement) place orders with the other for between \$200.0 million and \$300.0 million of military equipment. The purchase targets may seem small until we translate them into 1977 dollars: between \$800.0 million and \$1.2 billion in orders from each other in twelve months!

In the 36 years since the Hyde Park Agreement, there has been a North American Defense Market between Canada and the United States. No similar trading structure exists within the North Atlantic Alliance. If we are to mobilize the resources of the Alliance, ~~Europe~~ Europe and North America must establish a new two-way transatlantic structure which recognizes that standardization is macro-economic problem, which can only be solved by military trade.

A 15-year backlog of deferred cooperative effort will not permit us to focus on new development projects only. Short-term results must also be sought. We must achieve the optimum interoperability of current inventories. We must bring our days of supply to agreed uniform levels. There must be procurements from on another, and a start made on common logistic support. Employment and other political benefits must begin to appear within the terms of incumbent Congressman and Parliamentarians.

But long term goals must also be established, so that the Alliance will never again find itself fielding forces that can not operate together.

How do we do this? In my view, the President of the United States, with the bipartisan support of the United States Congress, should propose a macro-economic transatlantic bargain to Europe. The United States would:

- * Offer to match every defense dollar Europe spent in the United States with a dollar spent in Europe.
- * Offer to match the cost of every system developed in Europe for NATO use by an American defense development also for joint use, and commit itself not to duplicate.

Thus the more that Europe contributed to NATO's general purpose forces, the more the United States would contribute. In return Europe would agree:

- * To offset fully America's balance of payments deficit on military account.
- * To establish an institution within the North Atlantic Alliance (and we hope this would be the role of the European Program Group) which would permit Europe collectively to plan, finance and manage bilateral, non-duplicative, multi-annual, multi-project defense research, development, production and support programs with the United States and Canada.

Full offset would be delayed during a transition period since many of the foreign exchange costs now borne entirely by the United States would automatically become a shared NATO cost in a NATO Logistic System.

Then, taking a leaf from the statesmen who negotiated the Hyde Park Agreement, Europe and North America would agree to the following interim and long-range goals for each other:

Current Inventories and Days of Supply: A goal of \$2.0 billion per year, over and above current defense budgets to be spent each year for the next five years by Europe and by North America (a) to achieve optimum interoperability of current weapons, equipment and communications, and (b) to reach agreed uniform "days of supply" throughout the Alliance.

Equipment Standardization Agreements (STANAGs): Implementation each year of at least 20% of the 300 material STANAGs already agreed, and implementation within a year of all new material STANAGs.

Research: A three year goal for harmonizing all defense basic research, and establishing the widest possible NATO technology base.

Development: An initial three year goal of \$4.0 billion of complementary development projects underway on each side of the Atlantic.

Procurement: A three year goal of \$3.0 billion of defense procurement orders from one another.

Logistics: A four year goal for common logistic support of all common weapons and equipment now in Allied inventories.

North Atlantic Defense Market: By successive development, procurement and logistic support goals, Europe and North America would (by the twelfth year) achieve complete military-industrial interdependence within a fully-functioning North Atlantic Defense Market.


The short term goals will correct our most glaring conventional force deficiencies. They will also provide jobs to speed the transition from fourteen national defense markets to a North Atlantic Defense Market with a continental-scale producer and consumer base in Europe and in North America. The political cohesion, the public confidence and the real and measurable results obtained in the early years, will guarantee the political commitment to see the job through.

Mr. Chairman, these goals are demanding, but so is the response required by the Warsaw Pact challenge. The goals are attainable, unless we are prepared to concede that the free political institutions of the North Atlantic Alliance are not the equal of the authoritarian institutions of the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact. The goals must be met. Today, far more than fifteen years ago when President KENNEDY first made the point: we must be able to offer our people something more than a choice between surrender, or nuclear war.

But when Europe and North America, the two richest, most technologically advanced industrial economies in the world, are seen by the Soviet Union to have at last the political will to join their enormous resources for their common defense, the day may be near (and long before all goals are met) when we can begin to make detente a fearless reality.

THOMAS A. CALLAGHAN JR., Director
Allied Interdependence Project
Georgetown Center for Strategic and
International Studies

Supplement: Article entitled, "STANDARDIZATION: Le Defi American a l'Europe"
NATO Review, October, 1976.




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It was indeed a pleasure to receive your letter of July 26 and your expressions of confidence in me and in the Central Intelligence Agency. I have found that one of the real pleasures of my job is working with the fine, professional people within the Agency. It is my firm belief that informing the public about the Central Intelligence Agency and the kinds of people who work here will do much to help restore the public's confidence in the intelligence business. We cooperated with the CBS program "Sixty Minutes" with that objective in mind.

I also want you to know how important I think it is that people with firsthand knowledge, like yourself, speak up to correct some of the misconceptions some people have.

Thank you very much for that, and thanks again for writing.

Yours sincerely,

STANSFIELD TURNER

A/DCI, [redacted] kss/5 Aug

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